Mental Simulations
In
French, the skill of rapid strategic cognition is called "coup d'oeil," the "power of the glance." This is what the French called Napoleon's
ability and the term that Von Clausewitz used in his book, On War, to
describe strategic situation awareness. The good news is that this form of trained strategic reflexes can
be taught from mental simulations, which are the mental models inside our
head that have moving parts
almost like a machine.1
Studies into how people use mental simulations started with
studies of chess masters by Andre De Groot in 1946. An examination of
seventy-nine studies of mental simulations demonstrated by Gary Klien in his
work, Sources of Power, found that these mental
simulations cannot be very complicated. Generally, they can consist of no
more than six steps and three moving parts. More complicated models are
difficult for people to remember and manipulate in their minds. Simpler
models, however, fail to capture important elements of the situation. As
Albert Einstein said describing scientific theories, "Make everything as simple as
possible, but not simpler."
For the purposes of training our strategic reflexes, Sun Tzu
created a series of such mental simulations all at the right
level of complexity. His construct for understanding a strategic position
has five elements, but only three of them "moving" (though one of them, "the
ground" is also moved upon). His model for advancing a position has four
steps. And, of course, many of his models are simple recognition-primed
decisions: if this situation then this response where the response takes the
form of a single step, and the complexity is in recognizing the specific
pattern.
Another key to building useful mental model is to work at the right
level of abstraction.2 Models that are too general are more broad
but more difficult to apply, but more specific models apply to only a
smaller number of cases. Sun Tzu bridges this gap by providing general,
easily memorable models, such as the five-element model, with a large number
of very specific applications: five character qualities, five types of
spies, five character flaws, and so on.
The biggest handicap of mental simulations is that they tend to explain away disconfirming
evidence.3 However, Sun Tzu designed his simulations as alternatives to obvious analytical models. For example, the most obvious way to model an
army is in terms of troop size, arrangement, equipment, and armament, that
is, as a Greek phalanx or a cavalry troop. Sun Tzu did not develop his
system as a replacement for such analytical models and obviously expected
them to be used in addition to his strategic system. However, in reading his
work, you have not idea what formations or armaments Chinese period used.
Sun Tzu purposefully chose a level of
abstraction that omitted the types of details always covered by more
process-oriented simulations. This concept offers a revolutionary design
feature allows his simulations to be used as a cross check for other, more
objective analytical methods. This creates what the researcher Marvin Cohen
calls "snap back," an alternative viewpoint bringing decisions back into
sync with reality.
This is important because research into the use of mental
simulation shows that they often fail because people are too confident in
them.4 Sun Tzu recognizes this problem explicitly
in his work. Objective methods of modeling competitions propose to
be deterministic. This expectation of completely predictable results is, in
Sun Tzu's view, extremely risky. He taught the use of small, safe
experiments to explore the many unknowns in every situation. The strategic
reflexes he taught are necessary simply because we can never know exactly
what the next moment will bring. Though developed at a
useful level of abstraction,
Sun Tzu's mental simulations can be written down and charted out on paper.
This means that
they can change the habitual ways that people think and, eventually, react.
His models can be used to develop what the
researcher Pierre Wack called "decision scenarios" for the specific purpose
of training people's decision-making skills.5 Unlike conventional plans and forecasts, decision
scenarios aren't built to provide the answers but to give people a sense of
the forces at work. As Wack wrote:
"Scenarios must help decision makers develop their own feel
for the nature of the system, the forces at work within it, the
uncertainties underlying the alternate scenarios, and the concepts useful in
interpreting key data."
There are only two ways to develop the right instincts for
making good decisions under competitive pressure: through the learning and
use of mental simulations or through the trial and error of experience.
While nothing replaces experience, a proven mental model can help you apply
that experience with greater understanding. This is the advantage of Sun
Tzu's system.
Learning a mental model of a situation is one thing.
Learning to use that model as an expert requires practice with using it.
Only experience fleshes out Sun Tzu's strategic models transforming them
from conceptual constructs into practical tools. People who master Sun Tzu's
models see a dramatic difference in
the success of their decision-making. One of the most common results
they report is the ability to see things about their situation that they
were unable to see before. This ability is known as
seeing the invisibility.
1 Klein & Crandall, 1995, "The role of
mental simulations in naturalistic decision-making," Local
Applications of the Ecological Approach to Human-Machine System,
Erlbaum
2 Klein, The Sources of Power, 1999
3
Cohen, 1997, "Training the Naturalistic Decision-Maker", Naturalistic
Decision Making, Erlbaum
4 Hirt & Sherman, 1985, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
5 Pierre Wack, 1985, Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead, & Scenarios:
Shooting the Rapid, Harvard Business Review
